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The paper discusses the fundamental characteristics distinguishing the natural and social systems
from each other. It considers in detail the basic approaches, prospects, and possibilities of con-
structing mathematical description for social systems as well as develops the appropriate notions
required to do this. The main attention is focused on systems with motion treated as a characteristic
example of social systems where the development of mathematical description should demonstrate
the crucial ideas of fusing natural and social sciences.
I. INTRODUCTION
For many centuries science was much concerned with
the laws of the nature. During this time a large variety
of physical models based on developed mathematical for-
malism was created. In the middle of the 19th century
there arose a new area of knowledge dealing with objects
distinct from the previous ones, the human society and
the human behavior. At first, these sciences were only
descriptive, then in the course of time some of them, e.g.,
economics started to use mathematics in their investiga-
tions. Several attempts were made to transfer physical
concepts and notions to social sciences, which, however,
has encountered significant problems. The matter is that
the constructs developed for describing natural objects
are not always applicable to objects of social nature.
This raises the question as to what notions should be
developed and what mathematical formalism has to be
constructed in order to describe properly the dynamics
and evolution of objects and systems of social nature.
The present paper makes an attempt to find an an-
swer to this question, to formulate the required notions,
and to elucidate the way to developing the mathematical
formalism for the adequate description of social systems.
Since such objects are highly complex and multidimen-
sional we focus out attention on systems with motivation
as a relatively simple example exhibiting, nevertheless,
many basic properties of social objects discussed in the
next section.
II. PECULIARITIES OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Let us remind some fundamental features distinguish-
ing objects of social nature from ones of the natural world
(see, e.g., [1, 2]).
• (individuality) Social systems are made up of el-
ements (individuals, agents, decision makers, etc.)
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with pronounced individuality in behavior and cog-
nition. By contrast, for natural systems their ele-
ments of one type are identical in properties, for
example, all electrons behave in the same way un-
der equal conditions.
• (uncertainty) The individuality of human beings
endows social systems with uncertainty and vari-
ability in dynamics. As a particular result, in social
systems the regular and random factors are of the
same origin and equipollent. The dynamics of nat-
ural systems is either deterministic or the regular
and random forces arise via different mechanisms.1
• (memory and time constraints) The laws of social
systems can change as the human society evolves.
Thereby, first, a specific implementation of these
laws should have its onset and a finite lifetime. Sec-
ond, in studying the regularities of social systems
reproducing the initial conditions could be ham-
pered or even impossible. Third, a priory, it is
not clear how long the memory of social objects
is, in other words, how long time span should sep-
arate events in the past from the present instant in
order to ignore their effects. Natural systems, by
contrast, are characterized by the reproducibility;
under the same initial and external conditions ei-
ther their dynamics or probabilistic characteristics
are identical on all the trails. In this meaning, the
history of natural systems does not matter.
• (motivation and value factor) The human behav-
ior is governed by many motives for achieving indi-
vidual goals as well as obeys the social and cul-
tural norms. There is, typically, a set of possi-
ble strategies of behavior among which a decision
1 This statement does not contradict the uncertainty principle of
quantum mechanics, where the wave function obeys the deter-
ministic governing equation. The mechanism responsible for the
quantum mechanics uncertainty as well as the stochasticity of
statistical systems is up to now is far from being well under-
stood, at least, it is typically assumed to be connected with the
openness of physical systems or/and the dynamical chaos.
2maker chooses the appropriate one. In doing so
he applies to various value factors that reflect his
individual preferences and the social and cultural
meaning as well. These notions are just inapplica-
ble to natural systems.
• (information deficiency and learning) The decision-
making environment involves many factor that are
hidden for decision makers and simultaneously af-
fect substantially the dynamics of social systems.
Therefore decision makers seldom have perfect in-
formation about the choice alternatives. Thus, they
should draw on certain strategies of behavior that
are based on either own experience or the expe-
rience of the society. In the nature such a phe-
nomenon does not exist at all.
• (prediction) Human beings predict the results of
their actions. That is way the system dynamics is
affected substantially not only by its history and
the current state, but also by its possible future
existing in the human mind.
• (breakdown of the explicit means-end relationships)
The dynamics of social systems is affected by a
large number of uncontrollable factors, external
and internal ones. So if a cause and its effect are
separated by a significant time interval it could be
difficult to recognize and establish their relation-
ship even in terms of probability. For the disci-
plines studying natural objects the existence of the
direct means-end relationships is one of their cor-
nerstones.
Despite these differences, some overlapping between
the natural and social sciences has surfaced during the
last decades, giving rise to new interdisciplinary branches
of science. In particular, methods of statistical physics
have turned out to be effective in describing social sys-
tems (see a review [3]). The dynamics of complex social
systems consisting of many similar elements possesses the
self-averaging of the element properties. In other words,
to describe their dynamics one can introduce character-
istic elements. These elements exhibit a regular behavior
and take into account the human individuality in terms
of random factors whose probabilistic properties are iden-
tical for all the elements of one type. Such an approach
enables us to overcome the main hurdle for the inter-
penetration of social and natural sciences caused by the
human individuality and puts forward new objects like
the characteristic individual, the typical decision maker,
etc. [4] These notions are the generalized images that
characterize the common and reproducible properties of
human beings. They form the basis of the appropriate
language for tackling social systems using the methods
developed in physics, mathematics and other disciplines
of natural sciences.
It is worthwhile to underline that there are conceptual
differences between the characteristic elements of social
systems and ones of natural systems (cf. [3]). In partic-
ular, the notions of probability form the basic language
in modeling social systems. For comparison: the ele-
ments of systems of classical physics are described by de-
terministic laws on the “microscopic” level and only on
the “mesoscopic” level their dynamics becomes stochas-
tic and the probabilistic language becomes appropriate
for tackling their complex behavior. As another instance
of such a differences we note the following. For example,
electrons and atoms are relatively simple objects with
well known properties. The macroscopic complex phe-
nomena observed in their ensembles stem from the inter-
action of a large number of ‘simple’ elements rather than
are due to their complexity. For social systems the sit-
uation is different. Human individuals are entities with
complex behavior being already the outcome of many in-
ternal psychological and physiological processes. So a
complex behavior of social systems can be caused by two
factors. The first one is again the interaction of many
individuals, the second one is related to the individual
complexity of human beings whose behavior involves va-
riety of dimensions. So in tackling a specific social phe-
nomenon it is necessary beforehand to single out which
dimensions should be taken into account. Moreover, if
several aspects of human being play key role in the ana-
lyzed phenomenon there is a possibility that its dynamics
will be governed by various regularities with distinctive
features.
III. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Let us discuss in more detail the decision-making pro-
cess, which is one of basic factors governing the dynam-
ics of any social system. The classical decision theory is
based on the notion of the preference relation and the
utility function quantifying this relation (see, e.g., [5]).
The concept of the perfect rationality assumes the human
choice or decision to be determined by the most prefer-
able result meeting the maximum of the utility function.
The classical theory of decision under uncertainty also
deals with some utility function aggregating in itself the
realization of various environmental conditions in a prob-
abilistic way. However, such an approach encounters ob-
stacles caused by the fundamental properties of human
beings.
First, any decision or choice should be made during
a certain finite time interval. On one hand, such time
constraints together with the state’s multitude of the
decision-making environment prevent an individual from
identifying adequately the current conditions or estimat-
ing the probability of their realizations (uncertainty of
information about the system states). On the other hand,
it hampers the proper ordering of the actions and aims
according to their preference and priority. Various states
of the decision-making environment or various actions
and aims of individuals that are similar in value can be
indistinguishable for human beings in making decisions
3(uncertainty of event value).
Second, making a decision is evaluated, at least, by
two type factors. One of them is the value of the re-
sult, the other is related to the cost of efforts required to
do this, including gathering and processing information
under the time constraints. So both these aspects af-
fect significantly the human behavior. Besides, the time
endowment of making a decision is likely not to be an
independent characteristics but to stem from a certain
compromise between the two factors. The feasibility of
introducing the preference relation with respect to the
second factor seems to be doubtful, at least, it is an open
problem. Its solution is complicated by the fact that the
information about the decision-making environment can
be accumulated, thereby, the history of the system dy-
namics becomes essential (memory effects). The latter
feature, in particular, poses a problem about the feasi-
bility of initial conditions for social systems.
Third, there could be a long time span between the
moments of making a decision and getting its results with
a large number of intermediate factors. These factors
affect the system dynamics and are hidden for decision
makers. As mentioned above, it breaks down the explicit
means-end relationship.
These limitations in human cognition induced the de-
velopment of the concepts of bounded rationality [6, 7]
and limited cognition [8] (see also reviews [9, 10, 11]).
Under these limitations the concept of perfect rationality
is inapplicable to describing the decision-making process,
at least, directly. So there should be another mechanism
governing the decision-making. It has been proposes [11]
that the decision-making process in the social system dy-
namics is based on possible strategies of behavior rather
than the choice of final goals. Such a strategy is a cer-
tain sequence of local actions, i.e. a collection of steps of
achieving subsequent intermediate aims. These strategies
are the results of trial-and-error process and evolve dur-
ing the adaptation of individuals to the decision-making
environment under uncertainty of information about the
states of the social system and its dynamics. Following
[11] we will call these strategies heuristics.
These heuristics aggregate and accumulate the infor-
mation about the previous actions, successful and failed
ones. That is way the history of a social system impacts
on it dynamics. There are at least two distinct ways of
the heuristics formation.
The first one is the individual learning, i.e. the process
of gaining the knowledge about the successful rules of
behavior via the personal experience or the experience of
individuals directly related to a given one. In particular,
the idea that the individual learning plays the leading
role in the heuristics formation has been developed in
[12, 13] (see also references therein).
The second way matches the cooperative interaction of
many individuals forming large units of human society.
It is implemented via the formation of the social norms
and cultural values aggregating all the fragments of in-
formation about the human society for a rather long time
interval. The human societies possess own mechanisms
governing the social norms and keeping up the social or-
der (see, e.g., [11] and references therein). It should be
pointed out that this idea about the social norms is not
new; it goes back to works by Veblen [14] and Pigou [15].
There are at least two types of models for mechanisms
via which the social norms and cultural values arise and
evolve. One of them is based on emulating the behavior
of the most successful persons, i.e. the social interde-
pendence via significant others [16] (for a brief review of
relative models see also [11]). The other type models,
interdependence via reference groups [17], go beyond the
individualistic level of social interdependence. They re-
late the social and cultural proclivities of human behavior
to some large groups or their typical representatives that
have high social rank. In the latter case the heuristics
can be accumulated within such reference groups, which
enables us to regard them as some social capital [11].
The aforementioned features allow us to declare that
a new own mathematical formalism is necessary in or-
der to describe social systems. In particular, the appro-
priate notions and concepts should be concerned with
the bounded capacity of human cognition affecting the
decision-making process. The same statement holds also
for systems of other types where, however, the human
factor plays an essential role.
IV. SYSTEMS WITH MOTIVATION
In what follows, we will consider a specific type of so-
cial systems that can be categorized as systems with mo-
tivation. The systems with motivation are actually a rela-
tively simple example of social objects that, nevertheless,
exhibits all the general properties discussed above. The
behavior of their elements is governed by the decision-
making under bounded rationality and the leading role
of local motives, being the reason for the used name.
Another essential feature of such systems is the fact that
they are made up of many elements, which in turn can
be divided into large groups by similarity. Therefore the
self-averaging property should hold, enabling us to intro-
duce the corresponding characteristic elements.
In the present section we make an attempt to con-
struct the notions and concepts required for describing
systems with motivation and to discuss the appropriate
mathematical formalism, including the general form of
the governing equations. In some sense this mathemati-
cal formalism can be treated as a detailed explanation of
the essence of systems with motivation. Their particular
examples will be mentioned in the text below.
First of all, it is necessary to determine the phase space
of a given system in order to describe its dynamics. Due
to the active cognitive behavior of its elements the phase
space, {w}, comprises variables of two types, objective
and subjective ones, {w} = {q, h}. Let us discuss them
individually.
Objective phase space: There is assumed to be a collec-
4tion of variables {q}α, discrete or continuous ones, that
completely characterize the possible states of a given el-
ement α from the standpoint of the other elements. The
information about the current state of the element α is
necessary for them to make the appropriate decisions in
governing their own states. We have used the “objective”
term in order to underline that the characteristics {q}α
of the element α are detectable for the other elements.
They are not related to the intentions, plans, wishes of
the element α which are hidden for external observers.
It should be noted that the variables {q}α are accessi-
ble for external observers only in principle. As noted
above in a social system getting information about the
states of its elements can be hampered. The quantities
{q}α will be referred to as the objective phase variables
ascribed to the element α and their combination for all
the elements, {q}, makes up the objective phase space of
the given system. For example, the spatial coordinates of
pedestrians, the direction of motion, and may be their ve-
locities form the objective phase space of the pedestrian
ensemble, the coordinates and the velocities of vehicles
on a highway make up the objective phase space of traf-
fic flow. The set of personal opinions makes the objec-
tive phase space of voting process, cultural features with
preferences ascribed to every individual can be regarded
as the objective phase space of the cultural dynamics.
The production and comprehensive matrices characteriz-
ing the frequency of using and associating words to the
corresponding objects by individuals can be considered
in the same way in describing the evolution of languages
(see [3] and references therein).
The phase space of natural objects may comprise only
measurable (objective) quantities. Therefore, using the
notions and concepts inherited from physics the majority
of mathematical models proposed for social systems as-
sume their dynamics to be completely determined by the
corresponding objective phase space (see, e.g., reviews
[3, 18]). These models, however, are applicable to so-
cial systems as a rough approximation only because of
takeing into account just a few of their basic features.
In turn, among the objective phase variables a special
group of controllable quantities should be singled out. El-
ements of social systems try to control their own states,
which influences the system dynamics. This self-control
is determined, on one hand, by individual motives, de-
sires, wishes, goals, plans etc. and, on the other hand,
by the social order and the rules of behavior. It is imple-
mented via maintaining or changing the objective phase
variables or a certain group of them enabling this action
directly. The subscript c will be added to the correspond-
ing quantities {qc} to underline the given feature. Time
variations of the remaining quantities are determined by
these controllable variables and, may be, some natural
regularities. For example, in traffic flow a driver can
change directly only the velocity of his car. Therefore the
velocities of cars are the controllable variables, whereas
the coordinates of their position on highways are not so.
Subjective phase space: Let us introduce new quan-
tities {h} to denote time variations in the controllable
phase variables, {h := δtqc}. Here the symbol δt stands
for the rate of time change in the corresponding quan-
tity if it is continuous one or, otherwise, describes step-
like jumps between its possible values. The collection of
quantities {h}α determined directly by a given element
α will be referred to as the subjective (hidden) phase
variables of this element and the combination of all these
quantities will be called the subjective phase space of the
given system.
The quantities {h}α characterize certain internal pro-
cesses in making decisions by the element α. So they
are accessible only for the element α and hidden for oth-
ers. For every element α its subjective phase variables
{h}α are valuable in their own right. This is due to the
fact that internal processes accompanying the decision-
making themselves take effort in order, for example, to
get a decision of changing the current state of the element
α. In addition, time variations in the quantities {qc} can
affect this element in some physical way. Therefore, in
making decision the preferences are determined directly
by the objective and subjective variables simultaneously.
That is why the phase space of systems with motiva-
tion is made up of both the types of the phase variables,
{w} = {q, h}.
The general form of governing equations: The decision
making process governs time dependence of the control-
lable objective variables, which in turn determines the
system dynamics. Symbolically we write this in terms of
time increment in the phase variables
decision-making

{w} = {q, h}

{h = δtqc} +3 {δtw} .
(1)
However, in the general case expression (1) does not rep-
resent any function directly relating the phase variables
{w} and their time variations. The phase space even
extended in such a way does not enable one to specify
the dynamics of a social system because of the bounded
capacity of human cognition. The whole history or, at
least, its long fragment determines the dynamics of a
given system. In mathematical terms we have to deal
with the whole trajectory {w[t′]}t′<t of the system mo-
tion in the extended phase space {w} at the previous
moments of time, t′ < t, in order to find the increments
{δtw} in the phase variables at the current moment of
time t. Therefore the governing equation of the system
dynamics should be represented as
{w[t′]}t′<t
 // {δtw} . (2)
Here the square brackets at the symbol w stand for the
function w of the argument t′ rather than its value taken
at t′.
According to diagram (2), the dynamics of systems
with motivation does not belong generally to the class
5of initial value problems as it is the case for natural ob-
jects. It is likely that the closer a given event in the past
to the current moment t, the larger its contribution to the
system dynamics at the present time. So functional (2)
seems to be some integral over time with a kernel decreas-
ing as the analyzed point in the past goes away from the
current moment of time.
The structure of functional (2) has to take into ac-
count several features, in particular, choosing strategies
of behavior for achieving the desirable aims, the bounded
perception of human beings, and the role of social and
cultural norms. Let us consider them individually detail-
ing diagram (2) step by step.
Heuristics choice: As noted in the previous section,
the decision-making process is reduced to the choice of
local heuristics because of the bounded capacity of hu-
man cognition and the variety of factors uncontrollable
and hidden for the elements. These heuristics, i.e., the
local strategies of the element behavior are sequences of
actions focused on achieving local aims. Since in social
systems the explicit means-end relationships can be bro-
ken the specific actions of elements are evaluated by local
motives rather than intentions of getting final goals. The
latter goals can only single out some rather general class
of the element actions. Moreover the final goals are typ-
ically stated in a rather general form without particular
details.
In order to describe the heuristics choice we introduce
an imaginary phase space {̟}α in addition to the real
one {w} which is ascribed individually to each element
α. So we have actually introduced the set of spaces ex-
isting actually in the human mind. The imaginary phase
spaces enable us to specify a hypothetical dynamics of
the system in the near feature that can be expected by
its elements based on the available information. Every
imaginary phase space
{̟}α = {θ, η}α (3)
comprises the objective variables {θ}α of all the elements
and the subjective variables {η}α of the given element
α. These quantities specify the hypothetical states of
the elements in the “mind” of the element α. Therefore
the symbol θα′:α is written in bold to underline its de-
pendence on two indices, meaning the phase variables of
the element α′ in the “mind” of the element α. Collec-
tion (3) does not contain the subjective phase variables of
the other elements because they are hidden for the given
element α.
In these terms a possible strategy of behavior of the
element α is represented as a certain time dependence
{η[t′′]}t
′′>t
α of its subjective phase variables in the near fu-
ture. The hypothetical time dependence {θ[t′′]}t
′′>t
α:α of its
objective variables is determined by the given strategy of
behavior. The hypothetical time dependence {θ[t′′]}t
′′>t
α′:α
of the objective variables ascribed to another element
α′ 6= α is constructed in the “mind” of the element α
based on the available information. We also will use the
notation {̟[t′′]}t
′′>t
α to denote this strategy as the hy-
pothetical motion of the system in the space {̟}α. The
symbol {̟[t′′]}t
′′>t without the element index stands for
the heuristics as whole.
The elements are assumed to evaluate and choose the
desired strategies of behavior {̟op[t
′′]}t
′′>t in some op-
timal way, which determines the system dynamics. It
should be noted that in this choice every element α evalu-
ates possible strategies of its own behavior {̟op[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α
only, the behavior of the other elements is regarded by it
as given beforehand or predictable with some probabil-
ity. These features of the heuristics choice enable us to
represent symbolic expression (2) as
{w[t′], ̟[t′′]}t
′′>t
t′<t
individual choice
of system elements
+3
''N
NN
NN
NN
NN
NN
{̟op[t
′′]}t
′′>t
{h[t′′]}t
′′
>t
t| qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
{δtw}
(4)
It should be pointed out that in choosing the heuristics
the elements can predict the system dynamics extrapo-
lating the time variations of the phase variables in some
simple way, for example, fixing them or supposing the
linear time dependence to hold in the near future.
Perfect rationality: In order to find a measure for
quantifying the heuristics let us consider a certain limit
case called the perfect rationality. It comes into be-
ing when, first, analyzed situations are repeated many
times, with the environment conditions being the same.
Thereby the time restrictions affecting the decision-
making process are removed and the complete informa-
tion about the system becomes accessible. Second, the
elements are able to correct their states continuously.
Under such conditions the individual choice of the op-
timal heuristics {ηop[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α by a given element α is re-
duced to finding the maximum of a certain preference
functional
Uα := U
{
{̟[t′′]}t
′′>t
α , {w[t
′]}t′<t
}
(5)
with respect to its own strategy of behavior {η[t′′]}t
′′>t
α .
In the general case functional (5) depends also on the
element type, which, however, is not labeled directly for
the sake of simplicity. Functional (5) quantifies the pref-
erences of the element α in the choice of its own heuris-
tics, provided the system history and the behavior of the
other elements are known beforehand. In other words,
within the frameworks of the perfect rationality the opti-
mal strategy of behavior {ηop[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α is specified by the
expression
{ηop[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α ⇐= max
{η[t′′]}t
′′>t
α
Uα . (6)
By way of example, we note that in the limit of perfect
rationality schema (4) for traffic flow gives rise to Newto-
nian type models [19]. It is the case where the concept of
6social forces [18] holds. If the driver behavior is not per-
fect then the description of traffic dynamics goes beyond
the notions of Newtonian mechanics [20].
Expression (6) specifies the optimal heuristics
{ηop[t
′′]}t
′′>t as certain trajectories. Therefore, if the
elements with perfect rationality choose these optimal
strategies of behavior at the current moment of time and
follow them, then further correction of the system mo-
tion will be not necessary. The latter is the essence of
the Nash equilibrium.
We assume that the analyzed system admitting the
limit case of perfect rationality possesses also a special
point Q (or a set of points with equal values of the con-
trollable variables, {qc = const}) in the objective phase
space. This point united with the origin {η = 0} of the
subjective phase space matches the steady-state dynam-
ics of the given system under stationary external condi-
tions in the limit of perfect rationality. It means that
if the system is initially located at the given point, it
will not leave this point further. For example, traffic
flow where all the cars move with the same speed and at
some optimal headway distance matches this situation. If
the system during its motion governed by expression (6)
tends to the point Q or the corresponding set of points,
it will be referred to as an attractor of rational dynamics.
Bounded rationality: As discussed previously, the time
constraints together with the bounded capacity of human
cognition endow the choice of heuristics and, thereby, the
system dynamics with random properties. If two strate-
gies of behavior are rather close to each other in value
then it can be tough to order them by preference and
to choose one in a rational way. We apply the notion
of perception threshold Θ to tackle this problem. The
perception threshold as well as the preference functional
depends generally on the type of elements, which again
is not labeled directly to simplify the notations.
Let us make use of the preference functional (5). Two
strategies of behavior {η1[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α and {η2[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α are
considered to be equivalent, with the other environment
conditions being the same, if the corresponding magni-
tudes of the preference functional meet the inequality
|U1,α − U2,α| . Θ. It is the point where the form of the
preference functional (5) becomes determined. The mat-
ter is that any increasing function applied to the prefer-
ence functional gives rise to a new preference functional
describing the same set of the optimal heuristics. Intro-
ducing the perception threshold we actually fix its form.
When a currently chosen strategy of behavior
{η[t′′]}t
′′>t
α is close to the optimal one in the given sense,
the element α has no motives to change it. Roughly
speaking, if it is not clear what to do, to change nothing is
quite adequate. If the difference in the magnitudes of the
preference functional (5) for the two strategies becomes
remarkable in comparison with the perception threshold,
the element α recognizes the necessity of correcting its
current state. Exactly this choice of new more proper
heuristics is the point where the random factors enter
the system directly. Indeed, since all the strategies of
behavior that are close to the optimal heuristics in terms
of the perception threshold are regarded as equivalent
then the choice of some of them is a random event. The
time moment when this choice arises is also a random
quantity.
It should be pointed out that the perception threshold
Θ characterizes probabilistic properties of the element
behavior rather than the step-like dynamics. Namely,
let us consider two heuristics, the strategy of behavior
{ηc[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α that is followed by the element α at the cur-
rent moment of time t and the optimal one {ηop[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α
which is actually hidden for it. When the difference
in the corresponding magnitudes of the preference func-
tional (5) becomes equal to the threshold, |Uc,α−Uop,α| =
Θ, the probability of correcting the current state by the
element α just attains its maximum rather than exhibits
a very sharp pike. In the cases |Uc,α − Uop,α| ≪ Θ the
element cannot recognize the fact of the system devi-
ating from the optimal dynamics. States matching the
opposite inequality |Uc,α−Uop,α| ≫ Θ cannot be reached
because the element would respond earlier. In particular,
according to empirical data for traffic flow such events of
correcting the car motion are distributed rather widely
near the corresponding threshold [21].
Action points: Let us introduce the notion of action
points in order to describe the dynamics of systems with
motivation. An action point is an event of changing the
current strategy of behavior by some element in correct-
ing its state. Every action point is associated with this
strategy and the time moment of changing it. When the
dynamics of a given system is optimal within the human
perception characterized by the threshold Θ its elements
do not correct their heuristics. At these moments of time
the system motion is not governed by the elements and
proceeds according to natural regularities affecting the
system. When the system motion deviates from the op-
timal one substantially the elements recognize this fact
and correct their individual strategies of behavior. In do-
ing so an element selects some new strategy of behavior
in a neighborhood of the optimal heuristics whose thick-
ness quantified by the preference functional (5) is less
than or of the order of the perception threshold. Then
the given element follows the selected heuristics until it
recognize the necessity of its state correction again. We
note that the notion of action points for the car-following
process was introduced for the first time in [22] to denote
the moments of time when drivers correct the motion of
their vehicles.
In these terms the dynamics of a system with motiva-
tion can be represented as a sequence of action points, i.e.
jumps between various strategies of the element behav-
ior. The particular strategies of behavior joined by these
jump-like transitions and their time moments are ran-
dom quantities. These random transitions are the cause
of the stochasticity in the dynamics of systems with mo-
tivation. Between the action points the system dynamics
is not governed by its elements at all and is regular or
affected by random factors of natural origin. Symboli-
7cally this feature is represented by the following diagram
generalizing the previous one (4)
{w[t′], ̟[t′′]}t
′′>t
t′<t
individual choice
of system elements
+3

{̟op[t
′′]}t
′′>t
action points
t| rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
{δtw} {δth}ks
(7)
If such a system possesses an attractor of rational dy-
namics it can exhibit a new type of cooperative phenom-
ena. Indeed, by definition, the point Q in the objective
phase space matches the steady-state dynamics of a sys-
tem with perfect rationality. Then the elements with
bounded rationality will regard the system motion in the
vicinity of this attractor also optimal. To discuss the
given feature in more detail let us introduce the notion
of dynamical traps.
Dynamical traps: Using the preference functional (5)
we construct a certain neighborhood of the set Q
⊗
{h =
0} in the space of heuristics {̟[t′′]}t
′′>t of thickness Θ
and then project it onto the objective phase space {w}.
In this way we obtain a certain neighborhood DQ of the
set Q called the dynamical trap region. When the system
with bounded rationality enters this region its elements
consider the system dynamics optimal and the correction
of their state unnecessary. Since the system dynamics in
the region DQ is really close to the optimal one, a time
span between two action points could rather prolonged
in comparison with that of the system dynamics far from
DQ. In other words such fragments of system motion in-
side the dynamical trap region can be regarded as long-
lived states [23, 24]. Their origin is due to the stagnation
of the element active behavior for a relatively long time.
Therefore dynamical traps are able to induce nonequi-
librium phase transitions of a new type that should be
widely met in social systems [23, 24, 25] rather than in
natural systems. We note that the dynamical traps for
Hamiltonian systems was introduced in [26, 27] (see also
a review [28]) and for systems with nonlinear oscillations
it was done in [29].
Individual learning and formation of social and cultural
norms: Because of the bounded capacity of human cog-
nition, gaining the knowledge about the proper strategies
of behavior is crucial. As noted in Sec. III there are two
channels of accumulating and aggregating such informa-
tion. One is the individual learning of the elements based
on own experience or local interaction with the other el-
ements. In some sense it is a typical mechanism of co-
operative phenomena widely met in natural systems and
caused by local or quasi-local interaction of their parti-
cles. It seems to be possible to describe the individual
learning process using the introduced phase space and
perception thresholds. No additional variables are nec-
essary to do this. Indeed, let us ascribe an individual
perception threshold Θα to every element α. Then the
individual learning is represented as the evolution of the
perception thresholds {Θα} caused by some interaction
of the elements. Symbolically it takes the form
{w[t′]}t′<t =⇒ {Θα(t)} . (8)
In these terms the individual learning is reduced to the
time decrease of the perception thresholds {Θα} due to
the accumulation and aggregation of information about
the system properties.
The second channel is related to a unique collective
interaction of all the elements in a social system in ad-
dition to their individual interrelations of various types.
It arises via the formation of social and cultural norms
of behavior. These norms affect directly the heuristics
and their preference, and involve all the members of a
social system or their large groups independently of their
relationships and distance in space and time. The social
and cultural norms aggregate the information about the
properties and features of a social system during a long
time interval and make up the basis for finding general
rules of successful strategies of behavior. So in order to
describe the effect of the social and cultural norms on the
system dynamics some additional variables, the space of
cultural features {χ}, should be introduced. We presume
that the cultural features cannot be ascribed to individ-
ual persons in any way, they have their own carriers, e.g.,
books, newspapers, magazines, movies, broadcasts, and
other types of mass media. Symbolically the formation
of social and cultural norms can be written as
{w[t′]}t′<t =⇒ {χ(t)} , (9)
where, as it is rather natural to assume, the father a given
event in the past, the weaker its influence on the present.
In order to include the effect of these norms on the social
system dynamics we generalize diagram (7) as follows
{w[t′]}t′<t +3
individual learning '''g
'g'g
'g'g
'g'g
{χ(t)}

O
O
O
{w[t′], ̟[t′′]}t
′′>t
t′<t
individual choice
of system elements
+3

{̟op[t
′′]}t
′′>t
action points
t| pp
pp
pp
pp
pp
p
pp
pp
pp
pp
pp
p
{δtw} {δth}ks
(10)
which is the final diagram presenting the essence of the
mathematical components and notions describing the
systems with motivation.
V. CONCLUSION
The paper has considered systems with motivation as
a typical example of social systems, where human factor
plays a key role. First, the elements of such a system are
characterized by motivated behavior and the decision-
making process governs the system dynamics. Second,
8all the elements can be divided into large groups by their
properties and similarity. Therefore the self-averaging
holds in these system, enabling us to introduce the no-
tion of the characteristic elements. Their regular proper-
ties describe the common characteristics of the element
behavior, whereas the random ones take into account the
individuality of the elements as well as the unpredictable
features in their behavior.
Because of the bounded capacity of human cognition
the decision-making process is reduced to the choice of
heuristics, the strategies of the element behavior focused
on achieving a sequence of local aims rather than a final
goal. According to the general properties of social sys-
tems the decision-making processes under consideration
is governed by the following factors:
• local motives and stimuli because the explicit long-
time means-end relationship is usually broken by a
large number of intermediate uncontrollable effects,
• uncertainty and deficiency of information about the
current state of the system and the decision-making
environments,
• time constraints and bounded human ability to or-
der aims according to their preference,
• the crucial role of accumulating information about
the system properties and the proper behavior un-
der various conditions based on the history of the
system dynamics, which is implemented via indi-
vidual learning of elements as well as aggregation
of the information in the common social and cul-
tural norms.
Since these features affect the system dynamics sub-
stantially all of them should be reflected in the cor-
responding mathematical notions in describing systems
with motivation. In particular, the appropriate mathe-
matical language has to be concerned with the following.
• A system with motivation is characterized by the
extended phase space including the objective vari-
ables as well as the subjective ones. The objective
variables describe the states of the system elements
and their values are accessible, in principle, for all
the elements. The subjective variables character-
ize individual motives and plans of the elements
and their values are accessible only for the own el-
ements. More rigorously, every subjective variable
specifies time variations in one of the objective vari-
ables changing which the element affects the system
dynamics.
• The motion of the system at a given moment of
time is determined by the trajectory of its motion
at the previous moments of time as a whole. In
other words, the system dynamics is affected di-
rectly by the history of the system rather than the
particular point of the phase space at which the
system is currently located. Thereby the dynamics
of systems with motivation is not described by the
initial value problem.
• The dynamics of a system with motivation is gov-
erned by the individual decision-making process of
its elements. However, the explicit means-end rela-
tionships can be broken by a large number of inter-
mediate uncontrollable factors. Therefore the spe-
cific actions of the elements are not determined di-
rectly by the final goals distant in time. These goals
can only single out some rather general class of ac-
tions. Moreover the final goals are typically stated
in a general form without particular details. As a
result, governing the system dynamics is reduced to
choosing between possible strategies of the element
behavior focused on achieving a sequence of local
aims rather than on getting the final goals. The
previous trial-and-error experience of the elements
affects significantly the formation and evolution of
these strategies of behavior, so they are also called
heuristics. In mathematical terms these heuristics
are represented as trajectories of possible system
motion in the near future. Therefore the preference
relation connected with the given decision-making
process should be addressed to the these trajecto-
ries.
• Stimuli and motives for actions of individual ele-
ments determine the choice of such heuristics that
are optimal or considered to be optimal by the el-
ements. This choice is affected by the prognosis of
the changes in the system states in the near future.
Thereby the imaginary future influences the real
present, and vice versa.
• The systems with motivation are assumed to con-
form to the principles of the perfect rationality in
the limit case when the analyzed situations are
repeated many times, with the environment con-
ditions being equal. Under these conditions the
time restrictions and the uncertainty of information
about the system state are is removed. Thereby the
heuristics can be rigorously ordered by some pref-
erence relation, enabling a preference functional to
be introduced.
• The time restrictions, the deficiency of information
about the system states, and the bounded capacity
of human cognition give rise to the uncertainty in
the preference and choice of these heuristics. So if
two strategies of behavior turn out to be quite sim-
ilar in quality and value then they are treated as
equivalent and their choice is equiprobable. Quan-
titatively this effect called the bounded rationality
is described by the threshold of element percep-
tion. Namely, if the difference between the corre-
sponding values of the preference functional is less
then or order of the perception threshold than these
strategies are regarded by the elements as equiv-
alent. It should be pointed out that exactly the
9perception threshold removes the ambiguity in the
specific form of the preference functional.
• Due to the bounded rationality, the dynamics of
systems with motivation is endowed with stochas-
tic properties via the action point mechanism.
Namely, when the system motion deviates substan-
tially from the optimal one the elements notice that
their states are not optimal. An element can do this
when the value of the preference functional for its
current state differs from that of the optimal one by
the perception threshold. This difference causes the
element to correct its current strategy of behavior
choosing new one near the optimal heuristics. The
choice of this new heuristics as well as the moment
of this action is a random event. As a result, the
system dynamics looks like a sequence of random
jumps discrete in time between the possible strate-
gies of behavior, i.e. the sequence of action points.
Between these events the system moves without di-
rect control by elements. We would like to under-
line that the perception threshold specifies the pref-
erence functional variation when the correction of
the element states becomes most probable rather
than the step-like behavior of the elements.
• If in the objective phase space there is a point
matching the steady-state dynamics in the approx-
imation of the perfect rationality, then for this sys-
tem it is possible to introduce the notion of the dy-
namical trap region being a certain neighborhood
of the given point. Entering the dynamical trap
region the system spends inside it a relatively long
time before leaving it because of stagnation of the
element behavior. The dynamical traps and local
interaction of elements can give rise to a multitudes
of long lived states and nonequilibrium phase tran-
sition of a new type caused by the stagnation of
the system motion in the dynamical trap region.
These phase transitions should be typical for social
systems rather than natural ones.
• Because of the bounded cognition of human be-
ings, the knowledge about the proper heuristics are
gained and accumulated based on the history of
the system dynamics for a relatively long period
of time. This process is implemented via two chan-
nels. The first one is individual learning of elements
and can be described by evolution of the individ-
ual perception thresholds caused by local interac-
tion of the elements with one another. The sec-
ond channel is related to the common social and
cultural norms. They are responsible for the inter-
action involving all the elements (individuals) inde-
pendent of their relationships and distance in space
and time. Therefore the social and cultural norms
cannot be ascribed to the individual elements, and
there should be a certain special medium carrying
these norms.
Summarizing the aforesaid we claim that developing
physics of systems with motivation it could be possible
to fuse the social and natural sciences within common no-
tions and approaches. It is likely that the “microscopic”
language appropriate for this purpose should deal with
the trajectories of system dynamics as the elementary
objects.
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